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ABSTRACT 
In 2005, China, seemingly in response to pressure from 
the international community, moved the Chinese Yuan from a 
hard peg against the U.S. Dollar to a valuation scheme 
against a basket of international currencies. Whether the 
revaluation of the Yuan was in response to U.S. domestic 
pressure rising from the  increasing U.S.-Chinese trade 
deficit, manufacturing migration, rising concerns about 
globalization, is open to debate.  This thesis examines the 
2003 United States – China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (USCC), international organizations, U.S. trade 
law, and technologic applications within the context of 
globalization to provide an alternate understanding of why 
the perceived pressure to revalue the Yuan was so quickly 
and vigorously pursued. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to add to the extensive 
globalization literature. As such, this thesis will study 
the 2003 United States-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (USCC) hearings to learn how and why perceived 
pressure to revalue the Chinese Yuan was vigorously 
generated. This thesis seeks to suggest that encompassing 
the U.S. focus on problematic Chinese economic policy and 
market imbalances lays key dynamics of globalization.1 Based 
on the USCC hearings and recommendations, Polanyi’s double 
movement2 seem to be identifiable within these dynamics of 
globalization as the cyclic characteristic of these 
movements appear to be coming full circle. 
Figure 1, a dynamic framework based on Michael 
Goodhart’s definition of globalization, appears to be 
present within the commission’s hearings. This thesis will 
suggest that the macro-effects of market integration defined 
as expansion or growth of markets, rates of expansion, 
                     
1 Michael Goodhart, "Democracy, Globalization, and the Problem of the 
State," Polity 33, no. 4 (Summer 2001), 527-546, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-
3497%28200122%2933%3A4%3C527%3ADGATPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4, 529, 530 (accessed 
March 15, 2007). Globalization as it will be utilized in this thesis 
incorporates market integration, technological advancement, expanding 
power of Transnational Corporations (TNC), declining policy and 
regulatory role of the state, internationalization of regulatory 
capacity, and advent of hyper-modernity as categories of globalization. 
This is six of seven definitive points of Michael Goodhart’s definition 
of globalization. The last point is irrelevant as it concerns this 
thesis. 
2 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, Third ed. Beacon Press, 2001). 
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capital flows, manufacturing migration, and job flows or 
displacements are acting on the manufacturing and labor 
sector. These mechanisms are generating a “second movement” 
or action of society to defend itself. As such, the 
problematic Chinese economic policies and U.S. fiscal 
policies, in effect, may be amplifying these counter-
movements by increasing the speed or rate of market 
integration, expansion, growth, and dislocations. Therefore, 
reluctance of the current administration to intervene to 
correct or offset imbalances or unfair Chinese economic 
practices could represent a move closer to the self-
regulating market (SRM) or pure laissez-faire described by 
Polanyi that was so destructive to society during the 
Industrial Revolution.3 Therefore, the gist of this argument 
is that unrestrained globalization is nothing more than 
merely an unrestrained self-regulating market. As well, if 
left unrestrained the United States may see similar social 
characteristics seen within the Industrial Revolution time 
period. 
                     
3 Goodhart, 35-44. 
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Figure 1.   Globalization, Polanyi and the Yuan 
This thesis seeks to answer the question, why did trade 
protectionism within Congress seem to peak against China 
within three years of WTO acceptance? Subsequently, if the 
undervaluation of the Yuan, which was targeted by the USCC 
as a significant issue, was the predominant second-movement 
motivator then the congressional and SIG perceptual pressure 
from manufacturing and labor should subside as the Yuan 
moves into line with market expectations. However, if 
globalization with China or in other words, a move toward a 
more laissez-faire market, created the nexus for a 
perceptual pressure rise or counter movement then SIGs, 




these forces, if left unchecked, continue to exert, 
facilitate and accelerate pressure on the U.S. manufacturing 
and labor force. 
B. LITERARY REVIEW 
This thesis will view policy from three levels or 
options similar to the level of analysis put forth by 
international relation theorists. Level 1 is state-centric 
realism that seems to rest within the boundaries of state to 
state coercion.4 These types of responses or signals seem to 
be abrasive and tend to cause friction; however, they may 
produce quick, short-term effects. Level 2 is a step down to 
a liberal viewpoint that utilizes international 
organizations, NGOs, and transnational organizations. 
Finally, Level 3 is at the individual, social and domestic 
political level. 
1. Level 1, State Centric Realism 
Academics such as Waltz5 and Mearsheimer6 foster 
insights that nations act as rational individuals in a world 
of anarchy. Or in other words, states are individuals acting 
rationally in their own best interests. As well, “realists 
                     
4 G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno, 
"Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic 
Policy," International Organization 42, no. 1, The State and American 
Foreign Economic Policy (Winter 1988), 1-14, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
8183%28198824%2942%3A1%3C1%3AIATEAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7, 5 (accessed August 
18, 2007). 
5 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (United States of 
America: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
 5
see less cooperation in world politics than do 
neoliberal[s].”7 States exhibit individual characteristics, 
rationally discern best actions to maximize outcomes, strive 
to maintain independent freedoms, and cherish their 
autonomies. State leaders’ choices are somewhat based on 
security interests, economic interests, and wealth of states 
within the system and are usually aimed to maximize relative 
power. Although the social level is generally acknowledged 
it is usually discounted,8 though in some cases, the social 
level can “constrain the efficiency of leaders’ responses to 
systemic imperatives”9 thereby diminishing state autonomy. 
Most realists and neo-realist regard globalization as 
subservient to the state.10 The world system is still driven 
by economic and military relative gains where states are the 
primary actors. International economic organizations, 
international corporations, and markets continue to remain 
under state control. Most neo-realists would argue that 
globalization is challenging state sovereignty; although, 
                     
6 John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," International Security 20, 
no. 1 (Summer 1995), 82-93, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199522%2920%3A1%3C82%3AARR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5, 82-93 (accessed August 
18, 2007). 
7 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: 
Understanding the Debate," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 
1999), 42-63, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199922%2924%3A1%3C42%3ARNACUT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6, 44 (accessed August 
18, 2007). 
8 Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, 1-14, 5. 
9 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive 
Realism Revisited," International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000), 128-
161, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28200024%2F200124%2925%3A3%3C128%3ASSUADR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R, 143 
(accessed April 12, 2007). 
10 Steven L. Lamy, The Globalization of World Politics an 
Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 194. 
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states still remain in control.11 On the other hand, the 
state-centric realist would tend to argue that globalization 
is well within state domination.12 
Examples of this systemic view can be seen in U.S. 
foreign policy towards China. One example is the U.S. 
protest to China’s sales of Silkworm missiles to Iran in 
1987. The United States responded by stopping military sales 
to China.13 China promptly stopped the missile shipments and 
U.S. military sales resumed. However, sales were again 
halted after the incident in Tiananmen Square in July of 
1989. Additionally, the Tiananmen Square incident focused 
the Democratic dominated Congress’s attention on the U.S. 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status of Chinese imports. Since 
1980, Chinese exports had enjoyed MFN treatment. However, 
because China was a communist country, a presidential 
recommendation was required by law each year to continue the 
MFN treatment. As such, a human rights oriented Congress 
could reject the President’s recommendation for MFN status, 
especially in the shadow of Tiananmen Square. Hence, the 
1990 Congress and subsequent congresses have not rejected 
the President’s recommendation. In 1994, President Clinton 
coercively attempted to attach human rights conditions to 
the MFN status, although, this attempt lacked credibility in  
 
                     
11 Lamy. 
12 Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and American Power," The National 
Interests, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Spring/ai_61299041 
(accessed April 20, 2007), 46-56. 
13 Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: A History of Sino-
American Relations, Fourth ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), 270, 212. 
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the eyes of the Chinese and rightfully so. The 
administration failed to follow through on the conditional 
enforcement.14  
In summary, the realist point of view contends that 
states are individualistic and act on the world stage in 
their own best interests in a system of anarchy. States seek 
economic and military resources to maintain or add to 
relative power. As well, the governments try to maintain 
autonomy so as to wheel power freely within the world 
system. 
2. Level 2, Liberalism International and TNOs 
Level 2, liberalism, looks to international 
organizations and cooperation to bring resolve to issues 
within transnational organizations such as The World Trade 
Organization, World Bank, or other types of transnational 
world organizations. These types of approaches to policy or 
issues usually produce results that are somewhat longer-term 
solutions and usually take a longer period of time to 
resolve than coercive solutions. The debates between 
countries may contain heated disagreements but usually 
solutions tend to be less abrasive than the state centric 
view of Level 1 policy options. 
Liberalism agrees with realism on some fundamental 
planes. The anarchical state of the world arena contributes 
to the distrusts between states that pose obstacles for 
cooperation and prevent peace.15 Liberalism posits that 
                     
14 Cohen, 230-231. 
15 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory 
Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1987), 195. 
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“fundamental actors in international politics are 
individuals, private groups, and institutions who are on the 
average rational and risk-averse”16 and promote their 
interests based on wealth, values, and influence.17 
Additionally, states are represented by the underlying 
organizations and institutions by which social power is 
“translated into state policy.”18 States are not unitary 
actors; but, they interact on differing levels though 
complex transnational networks. The state’s position is the 
protector of rights, laws and property. As such, with the 
increase in transnational and transgovernmental 
organizations in recent years these organizations have 
developed to a point in which the underlying networks are 
viewed as an erosion of state power. 19 Additionally, 
liberalism does not posit state autonomy and state 
individualism. 
Globalization aligns more easily with liberalism than 
realism. The basic foundations of interaction and 
integration of markets and economies within the context of 
globalization supports the liberal view that states are not 
unitary actors. Globalization and liberalism posit that 
states act on differing levels through transnational 
networks.  
                     
16 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory 
of International Politics: Erratum," International Organization 52, no. 
1 (Winter 1998), 229, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
8183%28199824%2952%3A1%3C229%3ATPSALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2, 516 (accessed 
August 18, 2007). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 518. 
19 Georg Sorensen, Transformation of the State Beyond the Myth of 
Retreat (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 17. 
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One example of this view of policy was demonstrated in 
2002 leading up to the outcry from the United States for 
China to revalue its currency. In an attempt to persuade 
China to revalue its currency, U.S. leaders employed a level 
2 policy or signal by issuing strong demands to the Chinese 
government through the G7 and APEC international forums.20 
3. Level 3, Domestic Policy and the Social Level 
Another step down, Level 3, is domestic policy directed 
at the social or individual level. Accordingly, this view is 
a more intricate view of liberalism. These tend to be long 
term policies with long term effects. Ikenberry et al., 
writes that “Lake, Goldstein, and Ikenberry demonstrate 
state actors and institutions can play a critical role in 
shaping the manner and extent to which social forces can 
exert influence on foreign economic policy.”21 
Domestic educational policies highlight the practical 
success of “social policy at a macro-social level.”22 In the 
mid-1950s, the South Korean government began an active 
policy fostering the educational foundations of its country; 
consequently, the South Korean government now sees education 
ingrained within the fundamental core of its 
                     
20 Tomoyuki Nakagawa, "Internationalization of the Reminbi (Yuan) and 
its Impact on East Asia," Institute for International Policy Studies, 
http://www.iips.org/bp302e.pdf (accessed April 18, 2007), 4. 
21 Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, 1-14, 8. 
22 Santosh Mehrotra, "Education for all: Policy Lessons from High-
Achieving Countries," International Review of Education / Internationale 
Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft / Revue Internationale de 
l'Education 44, no. 5/6 (1998), 461-484, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
8566%281998%2944%3A5%2F6%3C461%3AEFAPLF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q, 462 (accessed 
May 11, 2007). 
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competitiveness.23 Green et al. demonstrated a level 3 
policy success within South Korea, Taiwan, and Singaporean 
educational policy.24 Green et al., presented Table 125 and 
suggested that domestic policy increased the average years 
of schooling for society over the age of fifteen. In 1960, 
the Korean average was 4.5 years and grew to 9.9 years by 
1990. 
Table 1.  Schooling Attained by Population Over Fifteen 
Years of Age 
 
An example of available U.S. level 3 policies dealing 
with globalization is the long term recommendations proposed 
by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
(USCC). The USCC makes recommendations to Congress once a 
year dealing with problematic issues of today and likely 
problems of tomorrow when dealing with China. To aid in 
                     
23 Francis Green and others, "The Role of the State in Skill 
Formation: Evidence from the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan," 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 82, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=405670971&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD, 83 (accessed May 12, 2007). 
24 Ibid., 82-95. 
25 Ibid., 84. 
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offsetting the growing technology dilemma26 between the 
United States and China the USCC recommended improvement in 
U.S. education27 due to increased competitive pressures. 
This domestic policy recommendation is a direct targeting of 
the social level to aid in offsetting future economic 
shortfalls in technology. 
4. “Habitation versus Improvement28 and Movements” 
In 1944, Karl Polanyi published The Great 
Transformation.29 Within his chapter “Habitation versus 
Improvement”30 he identified many key factors that explained 
the dislocation of large numbers of unsuspecting English 
workers through the technological changes of the Industrial 
Revolution. He criticized the underlying philosophical 
theory of economic liberalism and laid at its feet credit 
for the miserable state of social condition on which its 
nonchalant reckless attitude toward change had created. As 
well, he poignantly describes its readiness to accept the 
societal consequences of economic improvement as liberalism 
banked the unsubstantiated healing effects of growth with 
little regard for the societal condition. Finally, 
liberalism concluded by misinterpreting the social condition 
by viewing it with a strictly economic lens. 
                     
26 Technology dilemma defined in this thesis is China’s ability to 
decrease the technology lead of the United States. 
27 2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
[2005]), 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2005/annual_report_full_05.pdf 
(accessed October 26, 2006), 16. 
28 Polanyi, 35. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 35-58. 
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Through England’s enclosure period and the Industrial 
Revolution, Polanyi identifies the rate of change as a key 
factor in the dislocation of workers and their reactions. 
The acceptable rates of change depended on the ability of 
deposed workers to adjust to changes thrust upon the 
community or society. England was successful in traversing 
the Enclosure period by successfully slowing down growth or 
economic improvement to socially acceptable levels.31 
However, the Industrial Revolution was not so kind to 
English society as the social condition was portrayed by 
most period writers as a “veritable abyss of human 
degradation.”32 Polanyi suggests that the Industrial 
Revolution can be defined as the establishment of the self-
regulating market. He suggests that social upheaval or 
dislocation descended upon England through the guises of 
self-regulating economic improvement that ran rampant. As 
well, civilization struggled through much of the 19th 
century in attempts to protect society from this laissez-
faire mechanism. As examples, Polanyi offers many of the 
social programs established during and after the Great 
Depression. 
Polanyi’s double movement is portrayed as a struggle 
between forces opening society to the harshness of an 
unregulated markets and societies’ protection of itself. The 
first movement, based on economic liberal institutions, 
expands markets or aims at establishing self-regulating 
markets with little regard for social dislocations. The 
first movement’s methods utilized support from the trading 
                     
31 Polanyi, 40. 
32 Ibid., 41. 
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class, laissez-faire, and free trade. The resulting societal 
displacements, the second movement, used “protective 
legislation, associations, and other instruments of 
intervention as its methods”33 to protect society. 
5. The Yuan and Chinese Imbalances 
The USCC hearings conducted in late 2003 were presented 
to Congress in 2004. The key findings identified the U.S.-
China trade deficit as a major concern contributing to the 
erosion of U.S. manufacturing as well as adversely affecting 
other sectors.34 Under the auspices of WTO commitments, 
currency manipulation was identified first, as an area of 
concern followed by subsidies, technical and safety 
standards to exclude U.S. products, intellectual property 
rights, and discriminatory tax treatment. Hence, the USCC 
recommendations to Congress suggested action on the Yuan 
issue, action to investigate Chinese subsides, and urged the 
U.S. administration to utilize WTO mechanisms to address the 
Yuan valuation issue. Although, other key findings and 
recommendations were put forth, those issues focused 
predominately on security rather than economics. 
                     
33 Polanyi, 138-139. 
34 "2004 Annual Report Recommendations," U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/recommendations/04_website_recommendat
ions.pdf (accessed June 2, 2007). 
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The 2006 recommendations35 and 2007 hearings36 seemed to 
shift away from the Chinese Yuan’s primacy and focused on 
broader WTO obligation issues. Obligations such as trade 
barriers, non-discriminatory market access, institutional 
market mechanisms, intellectual property rights, 
manufacturing subsidies, Chinese enforcement of obligations, 
counterfeit exports, and monetary policy drew the focus. 
China’s Yuan valuation policy was addressed within the 
larger context of China’s internal and external financial 
and monetary polices. The Yuan valuation was mixed among the 
issues of the Chinese internal banking and loan system, the 
U.S. budget deficit and borrowing policy, the U.S. trade 
deficit, U.S. manufacturing migration, Chinese accounting 
procedures, and the purchase of U.S. Treasury securities. 
The inclusion of other economic issues within the key 
findings seemed to de-emphasize the Yuan issue as the 
solitary engine of the U.S.-China trade deficit. 
The 2006 recommendations37 to Congress were two 
separate lists. The key recommendations38 to Congress were 
the top ten issues the commission felt were of particular 
importance. These were pulled from a list of 44.39 In what 
seems to be a shift away from the Yuan issue, no mention of 
                     
35 "2006 Annual Report Recommendations," U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/recommendations/06_website_recommendat
ions.pdf (accessed September 23, 2007). 
36 "The U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in 
Perspective: Hearing before the USCC," 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/feb_1_2/feb_1_2_07
_trans.pdf (accessed September 15, 2007). 
37 2006 Annual Report Recommendations. 
38 Ibid., 14-16. 
39 Ibid., 205-211. 
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it or Chinese monetary policy can be found within the key 
recommendations. However, within the 44 recommendations, 12 
dealt with U.S.-China trade and only three were currency 
related. Intellectual property rights seemed to rise to the 
top of the list as the most significant economic issue. 
C. ARGUMENT 
According to Polanyi, the rate of change or market 
expansion is the factor determining society’s acceptance of 
that change. The main argument is that the rate of U.S.-
Chinese market integration is causing a backlash or double 
movement against the Chinese Yuan. The reluctance of the 
current administration to utilize WTO options, regulations 
and address U.S. trade and fiscal imbalances is a move 
toward an unregulated market. As such, globalization is an 
has become an overarching framework or market exerting 
pressure on the manufacturing and labor sector that resulted 
in what seems to be a “second movement”. In other words, 
within the 2003 USCC hearings, there seems to be two 
interconnected frameworks at play; an overarching one, 
globalization and a secondary one, Polanyi’s second 
movement. 
In 2003, the USCC narrowly focused on the Yuan and 
attempted what seemed to be a signal or “political 
intervention in defense”40 of the social level or 
manufacturing and labor sector. This resembled the 
reactionary framework suggested by Karl Polanyi.41 
                     
40 B. Hettne, "Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism," New Political Economy 
10, no. 4 (2005), 543-571, 548. 
41 Polanyi. 
 16
SIG and congressional perceptions of U.S.-China trade, 
manufacturing migration, and job flow imbalances experienced 
by the United States, as China moves to a market economy, 
may have served to increase the perceived rate of market 
expansion and therefore increased the perceived rate of 
dislocation and amplified the second movement. The cause of 
imbalances may lie at the hands of the United States or at 
the hands of the Chinese or maybe a little of both. However, 
if the administration continues to be perceived as 
dismissing Chinese market expansion and dislocation continue 
to rise, one would suspect a corresponding rise in 
congressional protectionism, the double movement. 
Although, this argument could be viewed by realists as 
an attack on state autonomy or by liberals as the natural 
order of economic policy formation working itself through 
the wickets of society. The proposition here is that failure 
to utilize market regulatory options such as the WTO or 
Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974 when obvious violations 
seem to drive up imbalances in trade as seen currently 
between the United States and China, is akin to moving the 
market closer to an unregulated state. If economic 
improvements are the ultimate goal then possibly more social 
consideration needs to be observed through rates of change 
options that may aid in preventing disruptive congressional 
intervention. Globalization may be the over arching 
framework driving the double movement within the 
manufacturing and labor sector. However, globalization is a 
rate of market integration or a rate globalizing the 
markets. As such, by decreasing globalization or the rate of 




Throughout this thesis, as any, several controversial 
assumptions have been made. In the 2003-2007 cases of the 
USCC hearings, Congress and SIGs perceived actual pressure 
within their organizations to the extent that action was 
required to demobilize the manufacturing and labor sector. 
Congressional perceptions of pressure stemmed from 
unemployment figures. For example, Congressman Manzullo from 
Illinois stated in the 2003 hearings that unemployment in 
the second largest city in his state was 11.3%; additionally 
in McHenry County, a suburb of Chicago unemployment was 
7%.42. Five of the seven congressmen addressing the 2003 
USCC mentioned in their verbal or written statements concern 
for unemployment or job loss within their districts or 
state.43 The assumption here is that pressure was exerted by 
the jobless constituents, either directly by letter or some 
type of communication to the congressman’s office or 
indirectly by the congressman’s intuition that the 
unemployment problem might surface at some point in the 
future in the form of votes. 
Special interest groups solely exist to work for the 
interests of their members. Membership donations and fees 
affect the direction of the organization and hierarchical 
autonomy seems to be less dense than U.S. governmental 
autonomy. Or in other words, SIG actions tend to be in line 
                     
42 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's 
Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact on the United 
States, One Hundred Eighth Congress First Session sess., 2003, 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/transcripts/030925tran.pdf 
(accessed March 12, 2007), 26, 29. 
43 Ibid., 5-34. 
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with members wants and needs. Wolfgang Streeck puts forth 
similar support in that “interest associations have been 
studied, they have been conceptualized in the pluralist 
tradition as 'voluntary organizations' catering to, and 
exclusively dependent upon, the perceived interests of a 
given constituency.”44 Additionally, intuitively by 
classifying an organization as a special interest group 
logically narrows the group’s political intentions. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Motivating Forces 
This thesis will suggest that the U.S. manufacturing 
and labor sector was predominantly motivated by job flows, 
manufacturing migration, and capital flow which is market 
expansion or integration. Administration reluctance to 
utilize market restraints appeared to act as declining 
policy, declining regulatory role of the state, and 
internationalization of regulatory capacity. Additionally, 
by utilization of communication technology SIGs facilitated 
the focusing of manufacturing and labor pressure within the 
USCC hearings and recommendations. 
Market integration will be explored through U.S. Trade 
statistics, foreign direct investment or capital flow 
between the United States and China, and job flows. Data 
from the Office of Trade and Industry Information, the 
                     
44 Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Community, Market, 
State-and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest 
Governance to Social Order," European Sociological Review 1, no. 2 
(September 1985), 119-138, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0266-
7215%28198509%291%3A2%3C119%3ACMSATP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3, 130 (accessed 
September 10, 2007). 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book, and a 
working paper from the European Central Bank will 
demonstrate market integration and imbalances between 
Chinese, United State’s, and international markets. The U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis database and a doctorate study 
from the Centre for Strategic Economic Studies provides FDI 
information for United States and Chinese outflows of 
capital. Lastly, job flow data is examined nationally and by 
sector from Bureau of Labor Statistics. The USCC hearings 
and recommendations will be utilized to demonstrate the 
possible causes of these imbalances therefore demonstrating 
action could be taken in order to regulate or slow the 
globalization process. 
The appearance of declining policy and regulatory role 
of the state will be examined through the reluctance of 
President Bush to invoke the China safeguard, Section 421 of 
the Trade Act of 1974. Documents from The Center for Trade 
Policy Studies, Michael Goodhart, and several United States 
Government Accounting Office publications will demonstrate 
one example of what appears to be the declining role of the 
state. Internationalization of regulatory capacity will be 
explored through the incessant demand of the manufacturing 
and labor sector, within the USCC hearings, for 
administrative action within the WTO on human rights issues, 
intellectual property rights, and exchange rate practices. 
2. The Double Movement 
The double movement is societies’ defense of itself 
through “protective legislation, associations, and other 
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instruments of intervention as its methods.”45 One example 
is the repeated recommendations from the USCC urging 
Congress to do whatever was in its power to move China in 
the direction of currency revaluation. As well, multiple 
bills have been introduced to defend the manufacturing and 
labor sector. H.R. 3306 attempted to remove presidential 
discretion in Section 421 cases and give that power to the 
International Trade Commission (ITC). S.1586 and H.R. 3364 
have been introduced to address the Chinese currency 
valuation issue. Additionally, the USCC recommendations have 
presented many calls for the administration to utilize the 
WTO to help address concerns previously discussed. 
3. Facilitating Effects 
Four political communication categories, conversation, 
broadcast, information aggregation, and group dialogue46 
suggested by Christopher Weare will be explored through the 
lens of technology to demonstrate Michael Goodhart’s subset 
of globalization,47 hyper-modernity. Through questionnaires, 
phone calls, and emails to the Manufactures Alliance (MAPI) 
and National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
organizational data was gathered and critically examined 
through a technological lens of each political communication 
category. As such, the facilitating effects of technology 
within the lobbying organization of MAPI and NAM become 
apparent and fit nicely within the hyper-modernity context. 
                     
45 Polanyi, 138-139. 
46 C. Weare, "The Internet and Democracy: The Causal Links between 
Technology and Politics," International Journal of Public Administration 
25, no. 5 (2002), 659-691, http://www.informaworld.com/10.1081/PAD-
120003294, 664-667 (accessed August 10, 2007). 
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II. GLOBALIZATION’S MOTIVATING FORCES 
This chapter will suggest that market integration is 
one dynamic in the globalization framework that seems to be 
etched within the USCC hearings. In Michael Goodhart’s 
definition of globalization he defines market integration as 
“the integration and expansion of markets in goods and 
capital, sometimes described as interpenetration of 
markets.”48 Consequently, market expansion and the 
subsequent social dislocations seem to have created 
perceptual pressures on legislation and similar activities 
such as SIGs to act in its defense. 
A. MARKET INTEGRATION AND EXPANSION 
This formula appears to take for granted the 
essence of purely economic progress, which is to 
achieve improvement at the price of social 
dislocation. But it also hints at the tragic 
necessity by which the poor man clings to his 
hovel doomed by the rich man’s desire for a 
public improvement which profits him privately.49 
Jobs move or migrate if barriers to do so are minimal. 
A country, Thomas Pugal suggests of David Ricardo’s 
principle of comparative advantage, will produce and export 
the goods of least opportunity costs and import those goods 
which are of higher opportunity costs.50 The demand and 
supply of labor can be viewed similarly as manufacturing 
                     
47 Goodhart, 527-546, 530. 
48 Ibid., 529. 
49 Polanyi, 36-37. 
50 Thomas A. Pugal, International Economics, Twelfth ed.McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 2004), 39. 
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companies will tend to migrate jobs to a position of lowest 
opportunity cost if unhampered by bureaucratic red tape and 
other barriers, i.e., free trade. As such, it makes sense 
that lower valued jobs are flowing to Canada, Mexico and 
China. In reality, it is not this simplistic. However, these 
basic free trade issues and their effects seemed to be the 
underlying dominant nuance throughout the 2003 USCC 
hearings. 
Market integration or expansion, the social motivating 
force of globalization, appears to be the engine of social 
dislocation. Rates of change or rates of dislocation and 
society’s ability to deal with that dislocation seem to be a 
determining function within society’s acceptance of that 
change51 or dislocation. Therefore, the rates of market 
integration or expansion may affect society’s acceptance of 
those integrations.52  
According to Polanyi as global markets came together, 
integrated and expanded during the Industrial Revolution, 
differing factors created varying social dislocations.53 As 
well, he identified similar factors and societal 
dislocations in the earlier Tudor period when wool 
production drove a conversion of open and arable land into 
pasture land.54 Polanyi contrasts the two periods in order 
to bring to light the differing rates of market integration 
or rates of change and those effects on English society. 
                     
51 Polanyi, 39. 
52 Ibid., 39-40. 
53 Ibid., 35. 
54 Ibid., 38. 
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The Crown’s earlier success in traversing the enclosure 
period lies in stark contrast to the social degradation of 
the Industrial Revolution. Polanyi credits the Tudor Crown 
with slowing the rate of market integration or expansion to 
a rate of change that was socially acceptable; he holds in 
contempt England’s failure to recognize the recurring 
circumstances and failure to slow those processes during the 
Industrial Revolution.55 
Accordingly, this section will argue that SIG and 
congressional voices perceived the social displacing effects 
of market expansion as suggested by Polanyi, not from 
society as a whole, but from a sector within U.S. society. 
Congressional representatives and SIGs appeared to perceive 
a corresponding pressure, necessity to protect, or 
motivation to act in order to protect a sector of society, 
manufacturing and labor. Perceptions of pressure will be 
analyzed through congressional and SIG statements concerning 
job flows, unemployment, and manufacturing migration and 
their perceived causation. 
1. The Deficit, Dislocations, and Perceived Pressure 
Economic exchanges across borders or the inward and 
outward flow of goods, services, and capital, represent 
levels of market integration. Georg Sorenson suggests that 
today, on a global level, markets are closer together; one 
way this takes place is through symbiotic market penetration 
of inward and outward flows.56 In the past trade flows 
between countries were superficial. Goods and services were 
                     
55 Polanyi, 35-44. 
56 Sorensen, 26-27. 
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produced within the border of one country and sold to 
another. After the establishment of the Bretton Wood’s 
system and advent of technology, manufacturing and 
production has been able to transcend to a regional or 
global level. Deeper integration has taken place by 
transnational corporation establishments that have created 
production chains made of intertwined economic linkages with 
cross-border networks. Market integration now regards the 
free flow, inward and outward, of goods, services, 
information, and capital across borders. Therefore, 
measurement of those goods and capital tend to represent the 
level of integration, degree of market overlap, and 
penetration or expansion of markets. In summary, the measure 
of inward and outward flows can loosely represent, market 
integration or expansion of markets. 
Hence, the U.S.-China trade deficit and associated 
dislocations seem to be generating perceptions within 
congressional circles and SIGs of Chinese growth at U.S. 
manufacturing and labor expense. The large U.S.-China trade 
deficit and perceived causes, exchange rate, intellectual 
property rights, and human rights issues, seem to be driving 
a trend of sector protectionism or protection of society as 
social dislocation and pressure for action is exerted on 
established political structures. 
As such, this section will argue that SIG and 
congressional perceptions of Chinese exchange rate policy 
and lesser issues were linked to U.S. manufacturing 
migration, job loss and job loss rates (dislocations), trade 
deficits and trade deficit rates. Additionally, 
congressional perceptions of growing American awareness and 
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pressure from Chinese trade issues appeared to set the stage 
for what appeared to be double movement or protection of the 
manufacturing and labor sector as the USCC recommendation 
seemed centered on the Chinese Yuan revaluation. 
Within the 2003 USCC hearing’s Congressional 
Perspective and U.S. Economic Impact sections, congressional 
and SIG voices expressed growing concern over job loss and 
manufacturing migration and seemed focused on the U.S. trade 
deficit as its perceived cause. The perceptual causes of 
U.S. job loss within the manufacturing sector seemed focused 
on the advantage received by the undervalued Yuan and the 
connectedness of the U.S.-China trade deficit and Yuan 
undervaluation. Although, the hearings did not solely point 
at the Yuan value issue it seemed to dominate the hearing 
dialogue as well as the final recommendations.57 
Congressional perspectives seemed wrapped around job 
loss, manufacturing migration, U.S.-China trade deficit, 
increasing rates of each, and currency manipulation issues. 
Table 258 displays each congressman’s expressed interests, 
concerns, and slant of causes. All seven congressmen 
expressed concern for job loss or the manufacturing base and 




                     
57 2004 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office,[2004]), 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2004/04annual_report.pdf (accessed 
October 26, 2006), 1 
58 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact 
on the United States, 5-34. 
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issues deeper than currency manipulation. Six congressmen 
expressed concern for the U.S. China trade deficit seen in 
Figure 2.59 
 
Table 2.  Trade, Jobs, Rates, and Causes 
Senator Trade Deficit Trade Deficit Rate
Job Loss 
Concern/Manufacturing 






Phil English Pg. 6 Pg. 6 Pg. 6 Pg. 6 Pg. 7
Lindsey Graham Pg. 8 Pg. 8 Pg. 7-8 Pg. 7-8 Pg. 9
Charles Stenholm Pg. 14 Pg. 15 Pg. 15
Byron L. Dorgan Pg. 15 Pg. 15 Pg. 16 Pg. 16
Charles E. Schumer Pg. 19, 21 Pg. 18 Pg. 19
Donald A. Manzullo Pg. 29 Pg. 25, 26, 35 Pg. 25, 27, 28 Pg. 25
Sander M. Levin Pg. 32 Pg. 32 Pg. 32  
 
Adding to congressional concern was the trade deficit’s 
increased rate of change and increased rate of U.S. job 
loss. As seen in Table 2,60 three congressmen cited the 
increasing trade deficit rates as disconcerting as well as 
three voiced concerned for the job loss rate. 
Additionally, the statement by Dr. Fred Bergsten, 
director for the International Institute for Economics, “if 
you put all those currency changes together the result would 
be a reduction of about $50 billion in U.S. current account 
deficit, which in turn would translates to something like 
500,000 high-paying jobs, mainly in manufacturing in this 
                     
59 "U.S. Data from the Office of Trade and Industry Information 
(OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce." Department of Commerce, 
http://tse.export.gov/NTDMap.aspx?UniqueURL=3uzl5w4534mjtmuntrbwuoeo-
2007-5-25-10-15-22 (accessed May 25, 2007). 
60 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact 
on the United States, 6-35. More than one page listed does not mean a 
stronger concern or interest in a particular issue. 
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country”61 further added to the commission’s perceptions 
that the trade deficit, as seen in Figure 2, was linked to 
U.S. job and manufacturing flight. 
 






















Figure 2.   U.S.-China Trade Deficit 
Perceptions of building societal pressure seemed to be 
influencing desire for congressional action. Within the 
commission’s hearings several members specifically cited or 
addressed the growing feeling of societal pressure. 
Congressman English referred to an unprecedented 400 person 
rally against Chinese trade practices resulting from job 
risk perceptions faced by U.S. citizens; additionally, he 
suggested further pressure may have been generated by the 
growing trade deficit.62 Next, Congressman Manzullo 
described America’s awareness of the growing Chinese trade 
                     
61 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact 
on the United States, 44. 
62 Ibid., 12. 
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issues63 that seemed to imply his sense of building social 
pressure. Dr. Roach and Co-Chairman Mulloy perceived the 
congressmen’s concern for constituencies as they discussed 
the “anguish of the American people”64 as well as 
Congressman Manzullo.65 
Although direct pressure seemed nominal, the indirect 
pressure from sector job loss and unemployment statistics 
seemed to hold sway over SIG and congressional concerns as 
seen in Figure 3.66 According to the Economic Policy 
Institute the United States has lost a net 1.8 million job 
opportunities since 200167 as determined from analysis of 
Census Bureau data. This is a combination of 337 thousand68 
job opportunities flowing into the United States and 2.1 
million69 job opportunities flowing away from the United 
States.  
                     
63 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact 
on the United States, 26. 
64 Ibid., 49. 
65 Ibid., 39. 
66 "Manufacturing Unemployment has Edged Down Slightly since Early 
2004, Following 3 Years of Sharp Declines," Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chart1-10.pdf (accessed May 29, 2007). 
67 Robert E. Scott, "EPI Briefing Paper: Costly Trade with China," 
Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bp188 





Figure 3.   Sector Job Loss and Unemployment Statistics 
Senator Charles Schumer of New York voiced his concern 
for jobs within his district as well as U.S. job flight. He 
related a story of investment banking that moved 800 
computer programming jobs to India and China.70 New York 
ranked 3rd with 105,900 total jobs lost. However, New York’s 
relative job loss placed it at 26th with a 1.2% total state 
job loss.71 
Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina grumbled to 
the commission about China’s capturing 20% of the world’s 
steel market and costing the United States jobs.72 By 2006 
                     
70 Hearing before The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies; 
Impact on the United States, 108th sess., 2003, 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/transcripts/030925tran.pdf 
(accessed May 31, 2007), 18. 
71 Scott, 3. 
72 Ibid., 8. 
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Senator Graham’s state ranked 20th, losing 29,900 jobs.73 
However, the relative job loss within South Carolina ranked 
it at the sixth position74 with 1.6% of the total jobs 
leaving the state75 as seen in Table 3.76 
Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota voiced concern for 
the flight of U.S. manufacturing. Although, he failed to 
provide any substantial data to his state’s plight of 
manufacturing he related a story about the Huffy bicycle 
company in Indiana.77 Senator Dorgan did not experience the 
extensive job loss as his friend Senator Graham.78 North 
Dakota ranked 50th out of 51 states, a total job loss of 
1900, and relative job loss of 0.6%. 
Curiously absent from the USCC hearing was any 
representation from California and New Hampshire. California 
ranked 1st with a total job loss of 269,300 and 3rd in 
relative job loss at 1.8%.79 Additionally, New Hampshire did 
not send a representative and its job loss placed it at the 
number 1 position in relative job loss at 2.1%.80 
 
 
                     
73 Scott, 3. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Of note here is that the relative job loss is determined by 
comparing 2001 to 2006 job loss numbers against the 2001 state 
employment numbers. 
76 Ibid. 
77 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies; Impact 





Table 3.  Job Loss Ranked by State 
Congressman State Job Loss Ranked by Job Loss
State's Relative Job 
Loss %
State Ranked by Relative 
Percent Job Loss
Phil English Pennsylvania 78,200 5 1.4 20
Lindsey Graham South Carolina 29,900 20 1.6 6
Charles Stenholm Texas 136, 900 2 1.4 14
Byron Dorgan North Dakota 1,900 50 0.6 50
Charles Schumer New York 105,900 3 1.2 26
Donald Manzullo Illinois 79,900 4 1.3 22
Sandy Levin Michigan 54,900 11 1.2 28
Congressman Participating in the 2003 USCC Hearing
 
The U.S. Economic Impact section further added to the 
sense of pressure for action. Speakers from the Treasury for 
Economic Policy, National Association of Manufacturers, 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce addressed the 
commission with illuminating economic interpretations. 
However, as the exact wording of Ms. Thea Lee’s speech was 
used within the recommendations to Congress, as well as the 
congressional recommendation’s focus on the currency issue, 
this section will focus on the perceptual pressures 
imprinted by NAM, AFL-CIO, and MAPI on the USCC. 
The Vice President of International Economic Affairs 
for NAM, Franklin Vargo, addressed the USCC and voiced his 
organization’s concern that China was manipulating its 
currency, therefore contributing to the growing U.S. trade 
imbalance81 and action should be taken on all World Trade 
Organization (WTO) violations. Mr. Vargo’s written statement 
addressed many of the globalization issues facing U.S. 
competitiveness by explaining NAM’s economic growth 
campaign. This campaign not only focused on correcting the 
China revaluation issue, it focused on U.S. domestic issues 
                     
81 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies; Impact 
on the United States, 175. 
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broadly addressing the growing pressures of globalization. 
For example, of the five proposed initiatives, four of these 
focused on U.S. domestic issues. These domestic initiatives 
aimed at making U.S. manufacturing more competitive on a 
global scale by focusing on reducing production costs, 
promoting innovation, increasing investment and 
productivity, ensuring an adequate supply and retraining of 
skilled workers, and improving policy infrastructure to 
advance U.S. manufacturing agenda.82 
The Assistant Director of Public Policy for the AFL-
CIO, Thea Lee, addressed the USCC with similar concerns. 
Currency manipulation, unfair advantage, and wage 
suppression were some of the issues brought before the USCC 
on behalf of the AFL-CIO’s 13 million members. Consequently, 
her address seemed to carry significant weight for action as 
her “call on the administration to use all the tools at its 
disposal”83 was carried almost verbatim into the 2004 USCC 
recommendations, “The administration should use all 
appropriate and available tools at its disposal to address 
and correct the problem of currency manipulation by China 
and other East Asian countries.”84 
2. Conclusion 
Job loss, unemployment, manufacturing migration, and 
the trade deficit seemed to generate perceptions of pressure 
or movements within the manufacturing and labor sector for 
                     
82 China's Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies; Impact 
on the United States, 179-180. 
83 Ibid., 187. 
84 2004 Annual Report Recommendations. 
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action. As China and the United States seemed grow 
economically closer together, sector job flows and the U.S. 
trade deficit have significantly increased. If inward and 
outward flows of goods and services represent market 
integration and expansion, then the U.S.-China trade deficit 
may be perceived as a one sided penetration of the U.S. 
market. As it stands, the trade deficit with China is large, 
China’s currency may need to be revalued, China may suppress 
wages, people, and human rights. Their expansion into the 
U.S. market seems or is perceived thus far as one sided by 
some. The perceived tipping of the playing field or the 
market distorting nature of Chinese monetary policy within 
the USCC hearings seems to have been perceived as a 
contributing factor to the deficit or one sided market 
expansion. SIGs and select congressional members associated 
with large manufacturing sectors seemed to perceive sector 
pressure or social dislocation from job loss numbers, 
unemployment statistics, and rallies. Consequently, these 
factors and events seemed to be interpreted as pressure for 
action or instill a desire to protect society. Although the 
USCC hearings were composed of non-lobby and non-partisan 
economist, their perceptions or views seemed to resonant 
less with the commission and its recommendations. As well, 
the perceived pressure seemed to spur a double movement 
focused on the Yuan as one way to act in societal or sector 
defense that emerged in the USCC 2004 recommendations to 
Congress. 
 34
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III.  THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT 
Let us return to what we have called the double 
movement. It can be personified as the action of 
two organizing principles in society, each of 
them setting itself specific institutional aims, 
having the support of definite social forces and 
using its own distinctive methods. The one was 
the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at 
the establishment of a self-regulating market, 
relying on the support of the trading classes, 
and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as 
its methods; the other was the principle of 
social protection aiming at the conservation of 
man and nature as well as productive 
organization, relying on the varying support of 
those most immediately affected by the 
deleterious action of the market-primarily, but 
not exclusively, the working and the landed 
classes-and using protective legislation, 
restrictive associations, and other instruments 
of intervention as its methods.85 
Polanyi notes that within the Tudor and Industrial 
Revolutionary periods social dislocations generated a double 
movement of society in defense of itself. Reflections of his 
argument ring within the context of Michael Goodhart’s 
definitional segments of globalization which are declining 
policy and regulatory role of the state and 
internationalization of regulatory capacity. Protective 
legislation in the form of introduced bills, associations 
like SIGs, and other instruments of intervention such as law 
suits served as the manufacturing and labor sector’s methods 
of defense. This chapter will argue that the President’s 
reluctance to engage policy under Section 421 is akin to and 
perceived as declining policy and regulatory role of the 
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state by select members of congress. On the other hand, the 
administration seemed to turn to international organizations 
in trying to persuade the Chinese to revalue the Yuan. 
Although separate issues, they seem to be linked in that as 
the state’s effectiveness seems to decline, although 
possibly by choice, it seemed to turn outward to 
international regulatory capacity to pursue or address other 
issues. 
Section 421 cases brought to President Bush and his 
reluctance to invoke already established policy, restrict 
Chinese trade, suggests that markets may act in restraint of 
policy decisions. Additionally, the initial filing of cases 
under Section 421, congressional response, and civil 
response seems to represent Polanyi’s defense of society. 
Several congressional bills introduced seem to be an attempt 
to fill gaps or force administrative action on policy 
already in place suggesting a perception of declining 
policy. Finally, the current administration’s attempts to 
address the Chinese currency issues through international 
organizations seemed to support the notion of 
internationalization of regulatory capacity  
A. DECLINING POLICY AND REGULATORY ROLE OF THE STATE 
Declining policy and regulatory role of the 
state: the diminishing policy autonomy of states 
and their inability to remain effective actors in 
international political and economic affairs. The 





                     
85 Polanyi, 138-139. 
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policy; rapid capital flows and speculation 
against currencies can destabilize and even wreck 
national economies.86 
President Bush’s hesitation to invoke the Section 421 
provisions, China Safeguard, and restrict Chinese trade 
seems to represent one example of this claim. As well, some 
signs of the double movement seem to be visible within these 
Section 421 cases and the responses to the administrative 
rejection of these cases. 
Section 421 emerged from the U.S.-China Trade Act of 
200087 and helped established normal trade relations between 
the United States and China. Section 421 also aided in 
China’s accession to the WTO by helping to bed U.S. 
protectionist’s fear of Chinese imports. It provided a 
safeguard against individual Chinese product disruptions of 
U.S. markets and lowered the threshold for Chinese specific 
exports.88 
The Section 421 process is a three step method 
initiated by a petition to the ITC. The Commission 
investigates and determines if a specific Chinese product 
has caused disruptions to U.S. markets. If the ITC finds 
markets were not damaged then the procedure is halted. If, 
on the other hand, the ITC determines that markets have been 
damaged, it makes a recommendation to the United States 
                     
86 Goodhart, 527-546, 529-530. 
87 Scott Robertson, "US Producers Seek Relief from China Pipe 
Imports," http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3MKT/is_30-
3_113/ai_n14917369/pg_1 (accessed October 14, 2007). 
88 Dan Ikenson, "Bull in a China Shop: Assessing the First Section 
421 Trade Case," Center for Trade Policy Studies, 
http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-002.pdf (accessed November 13, 
2006), 1. 
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Trade Representative (USTR) and the President of the United 
States. The USTR further investigates a remedy and makes a 
recommendation to the President. As of September 2005, five 
petitions have been filed. Three cases were found to have 
merit by the ITC and USTR and were sent to the President. 
Consequently, the President decided against relief for all 
three cases.89 
Although three cases represent a small number from 
which to draw a significant conclusion a trend differing 
from the ordinary seems to exist. Other cases exists under 
different safeguards and in those cases “Presidents have 
granted relief in half of the global safeguard cases in 
which ITC recommended relief, and in all such cases after 
Congress revised U.S. trade law in 1988.”90  
                     
89 U.S.-China Trade: The United States has Not Restricted Import 
Under the China Safeguard (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Accounting Office, [2005]), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051056.pdf 
(accessed November 13, 2006), 3. 
90 Ibid., 3. 
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Table 4.  Outcomes of Completed China, Communist Country and 
Global Safeguard Cases (as of September, 2005) 
 
Table 491 is from the GAO Report to Congressional 
Committees titled “U.S.-China Trade: The United States has 
Not Restricted Imports under the China Safeguard” and 
displays the different cases receiving relief. Although, 
only 3 cases under the China Safeguard present limited 
insight, if juxtaposed with the Communist and Global 
                     
91 U.S.-China Trade: The United States has Not Restricted Import 
Under the China Safeguard, 17. 
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Safeguards a gap seems to exist or suggest a reluctance to 
restrict Chinese imports by the President under the Section 
421. 
Table 5.  Reasons Cited by the President 
 
President Bush’s reluctance for intervention or trade 
restrictions in these three cases when overlaid with other 
safeguard cases seems to suggest some unexplained component 
or dynamic. The merits of each case were considered 
individually and together. For example, domestic concerns 
such as the effect of relief on all domestic producers, 
consumers, and distributors were considered.92 
Table 593 summarizes individual presidential reasons 
for each cited case and an explanation of why relief was not 
provided. Furthermore, the single common factor, high 
                     
92 U.S.-China Trade: The United States has Not Restricted Import 
Under the China Safeguard, 21-22. 
93 Ibid., 16. 
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lighted in red, carrying through each of the three cases was 
presidential concern for a production shift away “from China 
to other countries rather than to U.S. producers.”94 Hence, 
market reactions and possible consequences outweighed the 
gains of intervention under Section 421 and therefore seemed 
to play a meaningful role in constraining policy. Or in 
other words, markets seemed to constrain policy. 
Section 421 cases themselves seem to represent a 
dynamic within the double movement, reactions to the 
President’s decision also seemed to be a segment of the 
double movement and appeared to represent the convictional 
movement’s depths as it refused defeat or grasped at fraying 
strings in hopes of unraveling the sweater. The President’s 
reluctance to intervene through Section 421 resulted in one 
law suit95 by Motion Systems and an attempt by Congress to 
remove this executive power, H.R. 3306.96 Although this bill 
is dead and in reality posed little if any threat, it seems 
to represent action by and for the manufacturing and labor 
sector. As well, it seems to imply recognition of a policy 
gap or reluctance to enforce policy. Thus, both actions seem 
to align with Polanyi’s double movement theory that the 
social level will attempt to defend itself. 
                     
94 U.S.-China Trade: The United States has Not Restricted Import 
Under the China Safeguard, 22. 
95 "Trade Enforcement Activities," United States Trade 
Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/20
06_Trade_Policy_Agenda/asset_upload_file922_9075.pdf, (accessed October 
15, 2007), 235. 
96 Fair Trade with China Act of 2005, H.R. 3306, 109th Cong, 1st 
sess. Sess., (2005): 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=h109-3306 
(accessed November 14, 2006). 
 42
In summary, throughout presidential reasoning one 
concern or common thread carried through all three cases, 
manufacturing flight away from China with little or no gain 
to U.S. manufacturers or consumers. Or in other words, China 
trade restrictions would likely shift imports and production 
away from China and provide U.S. consumers and manufacturers 
with negligible gains. The market shifts or likelihood of 
market shifts seemed to highlight the constraining effects 
of markets and capital flow on policy and regulatory 
capacity of the state. Additionally, the Motion Systems vs. 
Bush lawsuit and the congressional response of H.R. 3306 
appeared to highlight another societal, manufacturing and 
labor, attempt to defend itself against the expansion or 
integration of the Chinese market. 
Dictation of policy may be a term to harsh to describe 
this situation; however, constraint of policy seems to 
better fit this example. Finally, H.R. 3306 seemed to 
represent to some congressional members the perception of 
administrative in-action or a voluntary decline in policy 
and therefore an attempt was warranted to fill this gap. 
B. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF REGULATORY CAPACITY 
Expanding power of TNCs and other non-state 
institutions of governance: the growing 
prominence of TNCs both as economic entities 
eager to elude the direct control and regulation 
of states and as actors and agents in 
international governance. Many observers note the 
parallel expansion of other quasi-public and 
private institutions of governance. 
Internationalization of regulatory capacities: 
the growing power of international regulatory 
regimes in a variety of policy areas. Many 
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critics assert that this expanded role comes at 
the expense of the power and authority of 
states.97 
Hand in hand with declining policy and regulatory role 
of the state is the internationalization of regulatory 
capacity. As market constraints seem to guide policy makers 
as seen above, some policy makers may choose to intervene 
via international organizations rather than utilizing a more 
direct policy. Although the ability of these international 
organizations to regulate is questionable, the pressure to 
conform to international standards or norms when exerted by 
a majority of the governing body may be quite compelling. 
Additionally, the choice to use these groups seems to add to 
their legitimacy or capacity to exert pressure. 
Several forums or international organizations engaged 
Chinese leadership concerning the valuation of the Yuan 
leading up to China’s decision to move to a basket pegged 
currency. The G7, Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), 
The G20, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) urged 
China to float or revalue its currency. Hence, in 2005 China 
moved to a basket peg of multiple currencies; although, it 
is unclear whether the effect of the forums, individual 
country pressure such as the signals from the United States, 
or a combination of the two led to the Yuan revaluation. The 
point is that the United States engaged these international 
organizations rather than implement restrictive trade 
barriers adding credence to the expanding power of non-state 
institutions and power of international regulatory capacity. 
Additionally, when one of the most significant military and 
                     
97 Goodhart, 527-546, 529-530. 
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economic countries in the world turns to an international 
organization in order to address issues it seems to abet the 
legitimacy of that organization. Or in other words, is it 
not fair to say when a country as powerful as the United 
States turns to an international organization that very act 
seems to set the tone or expand the power of that 
organization in the eyes of less powerful countries? 
Examining international organizational meetings in 2003 
and 2004, within the forums, a sense of increasing 
revaluation pressure can be seen. The 2003 G7 initially 
called for more flexibility in world currencies; however, it 
restrained from naming China as the specific target of its 
remarks.98 The APEC meeting garnered the United States some 
minor regional headway as there was a general call for the 
revaluation of the Yuan. However, reluctant to see a major 
move of the Yuan, the assembly urged China and other 
countries to allow their currencies to rise.99 The G-20 
meetings displayed a general growing concern over currency 
balances and floating exchange rate policies. Furthermore, 
the G20 Communiqué seemed to indirectly reference the U.S.-
China balances by addressing the IMF as seen within this 
statement: “We encourage the IMF to continue to enhance its 
capacity to identify vulnerabilities, such as currency and 
other balance sheet mismatches, and provide advice to member 
                     
98 Andrzej Zwaniecki, "G7, China Finance Ministers to Meet on 
Currency Exchange Regime," United States Department of State, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Sep/23-184387.html (accessed 
June 12, 2007). 
99 "2ND LD: APEC Finance Chiefs Paper over Forex Flexibility Issue," 
Kyodo News International, Inc. and The Gale Group, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2003_Sept_9/ai_107467333 
(accessed June 12, 2007). 
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countries on policy reforms.”100 The IMF found little fault 
with the valuation of the Yuan in 2003 or 2004. However, it 
did urge China in 2003101 and 2004102 to move its currency to 
a floating system. 
In 2004 several of these forums changed tone. The G7 
called directly on China to speed its transition from the 
pegged monetary system to a more flexible floating 
system.103 President Bush addressed the Chinese Minster 
candidly at the APEC summit in Chile and was assured that 
the Chinese system was moving to a more flexible exchange 
rate policy.104 The G-20 Workshop of 2004 displayed growing 
concern for currency balances and floating exchange rate 
policies. In a somewhat reserved manner, the workshop 
summary addressed the currency issue. However, the 
importance of a floating system was emphasized within the 
General Summary of the document, 
 
                     
100 "Fifth G-20 Finance Ministers' and Central Bank Governors' 
Meeting: Morelia Communiqué," University of Toronto, 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g20/g20_031027.pdf (accessed June 13, 2007), 
2. 
101 "IMF Says Yuan Not Undervalued," The China Daily, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/20/content_283019.htm 
(accessed June 13, 2007). 
102 "IMF Pressures China on Flexible Yuan," The China Daily, 
http://www.chinadaily.net/english/doc/2004-10/21/content_384507.htm 
(accessed June 13, 2007). 
103 "G7 Urges China to Quicken Pace to Exchange Rate Flexibility," 
United States Department of State, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Oct/04-174520.html (accessed 
June 12, 2007). 
104 Zhao Huanxin, "Hu, Bush Commit to Healthy, Strong Relationship," 
The China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.net/english/doc/2004-
11/20/content_393364.htm (accessed June 12, 2007). 
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Participants broadly endorsed the concept of 
exchange rate flexibility for countries with 
widely opened capital accounts, agreeing that a 
high degree of exchange rate flexibility provides 
an incentive to monitor and control currency 
mismatches.105 
As such, within the G-20 pressure seemed to be ramping up in 
support of China acting on their exchange rate policy. 
Consequently, a distinct change can be seen in the Chinese 
perspective. Contrast in titles of Chinese news articles 
from 2003 and 2004 suggest recognition of the growing 
pressure. In 2003, one article was titled “IMF Says Yuan Not 
Undervalued” and in 2004, the perspective changed to “IMF 
Pressures China on Flexible Yuan.” 
In summary, the regulatory capacity of one individual 
forum or group may not be binding. Though, as pressure 
builds in several or many forums the desire to conform may 
move countries’ leaders to bow to pressure. As such, it 
appears that pressures was exerted by the G7, G20, APEC, 
IMF, and other international organizations and may have 
influenced the Chinese decision to move to a basket fixed 
exchange rate. The degree of influence exerted by 
international organizations versus the influence of the 
United States is unknown. 
However, logically one could say the weight of the many 
likely weighs more than the one and the choice of the United 
States to utilize the forums seem to add significantly to 
that weight. The regulatory capacity or ability to exert 
                     
105 "G-20 Workshop on Developing Strong Domestic Financial Markets 
26-27 April 2004," University of Toronto, 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g20/20040625_ws_ottawa_summary.pdf (accessed 
June 13, 2007), 2. 
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pressure of the international community within the context 
of the Yuan revaluation seems to be clearly identified as 
permeating into the Chinese media and likely into Chinese 
society. The Chinese may have floated the Yuan because of 
signals from the United States. However, the international 
community’s call for change would seem to logically weigh 
heavier on China’s domestic situation in contrast to the 
view of bowing to United States’ pressure. Finally, it seems 
the act of utilizing international organizations by the most 
powerful nations in itself legitimizes and adds to the power 
of those organizations. 
C. SIGNALS OR DOUBLE MOVEMENT OR BOTH? 
During the 108th Congress, 2003-2004, multiple bills 
were introduced of the protectionist flavor as seen in Table 
6. None of these bills moved past the introduction stage and 
it could be plausibly argued were meant as signals to China 
and the President of the United States. What ever the 
argument is as to the significance or stated goals of these 
introduced bills the argument here is that they seem to 
represent something rather than nothing. Or in other words, 
if a bill means nothing then why introduce it with little 
expectations of passing? It seems these bills may be a 
response or action to some issue that has risen above the 
humdrum white noise of the masses. Whether or not the bill 
was expected to accomplish its stated or proposed goal is 
not important regarding this paper. The very act of bill 
proposition and the signals that were being sent are the 
point. The signals seem to have a purpose and that purpose 
seems to be the defense of the social level or in this case 
manufacturing and labor. 
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These bills seemed to serve as signals and they seemed 
to be action taken to coerce a change in Chinese trade 
policy representing the defense of U.S. society or the 
manufacturing and labor sector. Many of these bills were 
aimed at the currency issue and aligned closely with 
recommendations that emerged from the USCC in early 2004. 
H.R. 3364 if passed would have imposed a 27.5% tariff on 
Chinese products unless the President certified China was 
not manipulating its currency.106 
                     
106 GovTrack.us. H.R. 3364--108th Congress (2003): To authorize 
appropriate action if the negotiations with the People's Republic of 
China. GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-3364&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
 49
Table 6.  Bills with Protectionist Flavors 
Bill Number Bill Name Status
H.R. 5026 Textiles and Apparel China Safeguard Act Introduced
H.R. 3228 To withdraw normal trade relations treatment from the products of the People's Republic of China. Introduced
S. 1586
A bill to authorize appropriate action if the negotiations with the People's Republic of China 
regarding China's undervalued currency and currency manipulations are not successful. Introduced
H.R. 3364
To authorize appropriate action if the negotiations with the People's Republic of China regarding 
China's undervalued currency and currency manipulation are not successful. Introduced
H.R. 4986 Currency Rate Adjustment and Trade Enforcement Act Introduced
S. 1758 Currency Harmonization Initiative through Neutralizing Action Act of 2003 Introduced
H.R. 3058  Currency Harmonization Initiative through Neutralization Action Act of 2003 Introduced
S. 1592 Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 Introduced
108th Congress
 
S. 1578107 and H.R. 3058108 would force the Secretary of 
Treasury to analyze Chinese monetary policy and impose 
tariffs to equalize currencies.109 S. 1592 was not only 
aimed at China, but any country found to be manipulating its 
currency.110 Furthermore, H.R. 5026111 was introduced to 
                     
107 GovTrack.us. S. 1758--108th Congress (2003): Currency 
Harmonization Initiative through Neutralizing Action Act of 2003, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-1758&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
108 GovTrack.us. H.R. 3058--108th Congress (2003): Currency 
Harmonization Initiative through Neutralization Action Act of 2003, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-3058&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
109 GovTrack.us. S. 1758--108th Congress (2003): Currency 
Harmonization Initiative through Neutralizing Action Act of 2003, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-1758&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
110 GovTrack.us. S. 1592--108th Congress (2003): Fair Currency 
Enforcement Act of 2003, GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-1592&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
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force the President to take specific actions to enforce 
textile safeguards while H.R. 3228 tried to completely 
withdraw normal trade relations from China.112 Although many 
of these bills seemed extreme and were likely introduce with 
failure in mind, they seemed to be signals to the Chinese 
government. These signals seemed to be representative of or 
in reaction to pressures that were running concurrently and 
that emerged from the USCC. 
Congressional perceptions of inaction or failure to 
utilize established policy seem akin to perception of 
declining policy. Many of these bills seemed aimed at policy 
enforcement or signals to the President to act within 
guidelines already established. For example, H.R. 3306 and 
5026 were introduced to coerce action on already established 
policy. Additionally, all bills aimed at currency seemed to 
be in retaliation for perceptions of administration 
reluctance to file a China currency manipulation complaint 
within the WTO. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Internationalization of regulatory capacity and 
declining policy seems to be a give and take partnership 
within the context of U.S.-Chinese trade and Yuan 
revaluation. U.S. engagement and somewhat limited success 
                     
111 GovTrack.us. H.R. 5026--108th Congress (2004): Textiles and 
Apparel China Safeguard Act, GovTrack.us (database of federal 
legislation) <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-
5026&tab=summary> (accessed October 18, 2007). 
112 GovTrack.us. H.R. 3228--108th Congress (2003): To withdraw normal 
trade relations treatment from the products of the People's Republic of 
China, GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-3228&tab=summary> 
(accessed October 18, 2007). 
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within international organizations to shift the Chinese 
exchange rate policy seems to logically fill the gap or 
seems to explain the President’s reluctance to intervene 
under Section 421. Or in other words, as policy seems to 
decline the result is a corresponding rise in 
internationalization of regulatory capacity. Goodhart’s 
definition seems to suggest a somewhat forceful expansion of 
power by TNC’s and institutions of governance or that 
institutions are coercively seeking power. However, these 
examples suggest a more voluntary resignation. 
Additionally, comparing the two examples, declining 
policy and international organizations, highlights a key 
argument between neo-liberalism and state reinforcement 
ideology or domestic liberalism. Neo-liberalism looks to 
international organizations and cooperation to bring resolve 
to issues within transnational organizations and can be seen 
working throughout the 2003 and 2004 APEC, G20, G7, and IMF 
meetings. Moreover, the apparent reluctance of President 
Bush to implement provisions under Section 421 fits within 
the neo-liberal context of yielding to international 
organizations. Reactionary legislation seems to have the aim 
of forcing policy already in place suggesting a one sided 
perception of declining policy. 
The double or second movement can be seen in the 
Section 421 filings, protectionist medium of lawsuit 
retaliation, congressional attempt or threat of presidential 
power shift, and introduced congressional bills. Just as 
Polanyi suggested, society will move in protection of itself 
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through protective legislation, restrictive associations, 
and other instruments of intervention as its methods.113 
These examples of declining policy and regulatory role 
of the state and internationalization of regulatory capacity 
seem like snug fits within the globalization schema. The 
effects and reactions seem most readily identifiable within 
the manufacturing and labor sector due to its organization 
in unions. Likewise, the results seem to have been a 
focusing of political protectionism or state reinforcement 
attention on the trade deficit, manufacturing flight, and 
unemployment that metastasized against the Chinese Yuan. 
As the United States and Chinese markets have become 
more integrated, money, jobs, and product flows have rushed 
between the two countries, each filling the void in the 
other like the release of water from a dam. However, as with 
water levels, these flows between countries will most likely 
come to rest in the middle over time. The pressures created 
by these changes and the responses to those pressures give 
rise to the question, will the U.S. re-dam the river and 
stop the flow of water? Or, if the flow is unstoppable is 
there harm in slowing the flow of water to a more acceptable 
societal rate? 
 
                     
113 Polanyi, 138-139. 
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IV. GLOBALIZATION’S FACILITATION 
Advent of "hyper-modernity": the acceleration and 
intensification of various ties and transactions. 
Rapid dissemination of information, and the ease 
of direct personal communication strengthen ties 
among tribal, familial, and ethnic groups 
scattered among several continents, deepen bonds 
among people working in business, government, and 
policy, and contribute to the growth of a 
transnational civil society. Physical distances 
shrink before these technologies and time speeds 
up, leading to a restructuring of political, 
social, economic, and cultural boundaries and 
institutions that makes them more fluid, open, 
and interconnected.114 
In today’s new age of technological advancements and 
hyper modernity, the idea disseminating and mobilizing 
effects of mass media seem expedited when juxtaposed to 
classical forms of mediums. Mediums like the telegraph have 
been replaced by the telephone. Cell phones, internet 
phones, and Blackberry type devices are supplementing and to 
a small extent replacing telephones. Newspapers and news 
television have included the internet as part of their 
repertoire of news delivery. The steady march of technology 
in America’s fast paced society has allowed for and possibly 
demanded the advent of quicker and speedier forms of 
communication in order to rapidly disseminate ideas and 
facilitate collaboration at a much lower cost as compared to 
past mediums and can be expressed as hyper-modernity. 
To say that technology is driving hyper-modernity or 
vice versa would be a difficult task to prove. However, to 
                     
114 Goodhart, 527-546, 530. 
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say both have facilitated, eased, or even possibly 
accelerated the focusing of social pressure or mobilization 
of the manufacturing and labor sector on the Chinese Yuan 
issue may be somewhat less tedious. The following argument 
is that technology seems to be reducing the communication 
barriers of time, space, same place/same time (SPST),115 and 
costs and by doing so has facilitated or accelerated the 
ability to mobilize people around ideas more quickly than in 
the pre-information age. In this case, the organizations of 
NAM and MAPI extensively used technology for intra-
organizational communications, information dissemination, 
and collaboration in order to mobilize support and influence 
perceptions of the USCC on the Chinese Yuan issue of 
revaluation. Specifically, technology allowed mobilization 
to be more efficient or quicker, more precise, and resulted 
in more collaboration than would have been possible in cases 
before the advent of the internet, cell phones, e-mail, and 
web pages. 
A. COMMUNICATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
Mass communication defines democracy and helps 
mold the social character of the modern 
individual as a predictable, if not anticipated, 
participant in the discourse of a capitalist 
society. Institutions of mass communication – 






                     
115 Same place and same time (SPST) is a separate obstacle to 
overcome separate from space. It is a timing obstacle or coordination 
problem between the sender and receiver that lies outside of the simple 
space issue. 
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civilization – are the defining channels of the 
cultural, political, and economic discourse of 
society.116 
Communication barriers exist throughout U.S. society. 
They take many forms such as language, attitudes, 
prejudices, time, space, SPST, and costs. The list of 
barriers is almost endless. Time as a barrier can be 
conceptualized not as a wall that prevents communication but 
an impediment that stretches out the process of 
communication, exchange of ideas, or collaboration. Or in 
other words, time is a barrier if a great deal of it passes 
between the sender’s dispatches of ideas to the receiver’s 
reception of ideas and if the exchange or coordination of 
ideas, collaboration, has a deadline. On the other hand, 
space as a barrier can be conceptualized as the physical 
distance between the sender and the receiver. 
Time and space have played a somewhat proportionate 
give and take role before the advent of the telegraph and 
telephone. For example, a face-to-face meeting between two 
parties tended to bring the time and space barriers to a 
minimum. The receiver would almost receive the communication 
from the sender instantaneously (minimum time) because the 
distance between the two parties was at a minimum. However, 
if the two parties were separated by the Atlantic Ocean then 
time and space had significantly increased. 
SPST is a separate amalgamation of time and space that 
tends to act independently as a barrier apart from the 
individual barriers acting alone. SPST is a type of 
                     
116 Hanno Hardt, Myths for the Masses: An Essay on Mass 
Communication, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), 1. 
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coordination barrier between the sender and receiver in that 
the sender must be at or near the same place at the same 
time as the receiver. For example, in face-to-face 
communications both must coordinate schedules, make 
arrangements for transportation, and show up at a specific 
place and time. Additionally, these prearranged meetings may 
only allow for the current situations to be discussed. Any 
new changes or developments between face-to-face meetings 
would have to be inked and mailed, a long process before the 
telegraph. Another SPST barrier can be visualized through a 
missed telephone call. The telephone tends to shrink time 
and space. However, if the receiver was not available to 
take the call then ideas fail to flow between the sender and 
receiver; therefore a coordination barrier existed. 
Costs tend to act as a barrier in several ways. New 
technologies tend to be expensive; however, over time they 
tend to taper to a more affordable level. The initial costs 
of new technologies tend to limit access to the masses. 
Telephones, cell phones, and personal computers are great 
examples of how the expense of technologies has decreased 
over time. Additionally, service charges tend to follow the 
same pattern. This can be seen in the large expense of cell 
phone service ten years ago that has now decreased to almost 
the same cost as telephone services. Communication barriers 
are a dime a dozen. However, technology has decreased the 
barriers of time, space, distance, and SPST in significant 
ways. 
In the case of NAM and MAPI these technologies seem to 
have allowed an efficient and more focused mobilization of 
support within each organization in order to mount a much 
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quicker response on behalf of social pressure. The argument 
that follows will look at some of the categories of 
political discourse and how each has been affected by some 
new technologies. Additionally, it will examine how NAM and 
MAPI have applied these technologies in order to increase 
the efficiencies of communications within their 
organizations. 
According to Christopher Weare there are four 
categories of political communication, conversation, 
information aggregation, broadcast, and group dialogue, 
which can be graphically seen in Figure 4.117 Of these 
categories, conversation, information aggregation, and 
broadcast can be identified within the political networks of 
the NAM and MAPI as significant conduits or channels of 
informational flow and have been affected by technological 
change. 
 
Figure 4.   Political Communication 
 
                     
117 Weare, 659-691,664-667. 
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Hence, these sections seek to demonstrate hypermodernity and 
technologic changes have worked to shrink the barriers of 
time, space, distance, and SPST and therefore allowed social 
dislocating pressure quicker perceptual influence on 
domestic leadership. 
1. Conversational Transformation 
Figure 4 graphically demonstrates the category of 
conversation in terms of one or few senders communicating 
with one or few receivers. Historical examples of 
conversation are face to face conversing and letter writing. 
Face to face conversation offers the added benefit or 
quality of body language over letter writing. However, face 
to face conversation is limited or handicapped by space and 
SPST. Face to face conversation is limited by space in that 
the sender and receiver must be as close to each other as 
their voices will carry. However, SPST is a coordination 
problem or hurdle in that the sender and receiver must be at 























Figure 5.   Conversation Pre-Telephone 
Letter writing as seen in Figure 5 has the benefit of 
closing space and offsetting or overcoming SPST barriers. A 
letter is written by the sender and once received will sit 
and wait until the adequate time arises for a receiver to 
read it. The coordination of two people arranging busy 
schedules to meet at the same place at the same time, face 
to face, is eliminated. However, the drawback now becomes 
the loss of time or in other words the time to convey ideas 
is significantly increased by travel time through space. 
These barriers can be seen in Figure 5 as increasing or 
decreasing when moving from face to face conversation to 
letter writing. 
The invention of the telephone added a great tool or 
medium to overcome space and time barriers. The telephone 
was able to decrease or shrink the time barrier as compared 
to letter writing and shrink space by allowing conversations 
over great distances. However, the telephone was still prone 
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to the SPST coordination problems between sender and 
receiver. Or in other words, the sender had to call the 
receiver at a specific number (place) and the receiver had 
to be near the telephone at that exact time. 
The advent of the cell phone shifted communication 
barriers. Figure 6 demonstrates how technology began to move 
these communication barriers around.118 Although, the 
relative costs of cell phones are inexpensive and continue 
to decrease, their costs are still relevant enough to 
warrant noting and can be seen in Figure 6 on the mid-way 
line moving to the decrease side. Additionally, SPST is on 
the line because cell phones have essentially removed the 
“place” in same place/same time, but the “time” is still a 
factor. 
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Figure 6.   Conversation Post Cell Phone 
However, the cell phone cannot fully discount time in the 
way a letter can wait to be read. Or in other words, if the 
sender calls the receiver while he or she is in a meeting 
that person may not take the call. Granted, voicemail could 



























































Figure 7.   Conversation Post Blackberry 
Finally the next step in technologic advancement 
brought into existence Blackberry type devices. These 
devices are cell phones combined with email capability. 
These tortuous devices bring connectivity and availability 
to a level of overkill. Although, relatively expensive as 
compared to the simple cell phones, these devices are in use 
by many top executives. The U.S. Air Force is issuing 
Blackberries at Vance AFB in Enid, OK, providing one for the 




officer.119 The Blackberry provides the chain of command, up 
and down, with almost 100 percent availability and almost 
complete elimination of SPST. 
In summary, technology seems to be helping to decrease 
some of the individual communication barriers such as time, 
space, SPST, and expense. Conveying ideas via letter writing 
of the not so distant past has seen a dramatic reduction in 
time and space and a dramatic increase in availability 
between sender and receiver with the advent of the cell 
phone, email, voice mail, and Blackberry. Ideas that use to 
flow in days now flow in seconds. This may greatly enhance 
the collaboration effort between individuals on a given 
project within a specific time frame. Many more exchanges of 
ideas can flow between individuals with the aid of 
technology when time frames are limited. As such, the 
reduction in communication barriers or shrinking of time, 
space, SPST, and expense seems to fit snugly within 
Goodhart’s definition of hyper-modernity and technology. 
The role of hyper-modernity can be seen at play within 
the MAPI and NAM organizations as many of these electronic 
devices are used on a daily basis, especially within the 
organizational command or leaders. Over the last few years 
many of these organizations have come to rely on 
communication technology (ICT) for quicker and cheaper means 
of conversation, even when the organizations are somewhat 
self-contained within one location rather than dispersed  
 
 
                     
119 The author was stationed at Vance AFB, Enid, OK, from 1998-2001, 
2002-2006. 
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throughout the country. However, face-to-face communications 
continue to be utilized but tend to take a back seat to 
newer technologies. 
MAPI’s organization has a staff of approximately 40 
people predominately residing in Arlington, Virginia. Staff 
meetings are generally conducted approximately once per 
quarter120 and communications between meetings are conducted 
by a smattering of face-to-face meetings, telephone and cell 
phone calls, and emails.121 Cell phones and email are 
utilized when employees are traveling away from their local 
area. Blackberry use is limited. However, MAPI’s marketing 
and sales department utilizes these devices. 
Intra-office communications within NAM is conducted in 
much the same manner as MAPI, generally by telephone, cell 
phones, email, Blackberries, and face-to-face meetings.122 
The NAM structure is somewhat different than MAPI’s in that 
NAM is made up of a Board of Directors consisting of about 
240 CEO’s, and a smaller Executive Committee that may make 
decisions on behalf of the full Board when necessary. The 
Board of Directors and the Executive Committee meet at the 
same time twice a year with the Executive Committee meeting 
one additional time throughout the year.123 When 
communication with the entire board is required between 
meetings, emails are primarily sent to members and sometimes 
hard copies. MAPI also sends out newsletters mostly via 
                     
120 Cam Mackey, Manufacturers Alliance, Director, Marketing & GM 
Councils, e-mail correspondence, September 4, 2007 (MAPI). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Hank Cox, National Association of Manufactures, Vice President, 
Communications & Media Relations, e-mail correspondence, July 26, 2007. 
123 Ibid. 
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email, although some members still prefer paper copies. Most 
communications with larger manufacturers is done via email. 
Other types of technology based communications used within 
MAPI’s internal operations are phone conferences and to a 
lesser extent faxes. 
2. Broadcast Transformation 
Referring to Figure 4, broadcast communication can be 
visualized as one or few senders to many or mass receivers. 
The newspaper, television news, and radio are classic 
examples of media produced by the few and read by the many. 
However, one could argue that television and radio are a 
technologic advancement in mass communications. For purposes 
of this essay the two will be considered classic, although 
not outdated. 
Broadcast barriers at first glance seem to be small. If 
examined from the information receiver view point the 
barriers are small. Broadcast communication barriers of 
SPST, the coordination barrier, seem to exist, however, 
limited. For example, the newspaper has limited SPST. The 
receiver must find and purchase a newspaper, not a difficult 
task in today’s world with a convenience store on every 
corner. Additionally, the news can be heard almost at the 
top of every hour on the radio. With the grand selection of 
stations in urban areas one would be hard pressed not to 
find the news at any given moment. Cable television news can 
be seen almost 24 hours a day. Therefore, the SPST barrier, 
time, and space seem to be minimal from the receiver’s 
viewpoint. 
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So, if the communication barriers discussed above seem 
to be at a minimum, then how has technology transformed mass 
communication? As in all complex questions in social 
science, the answers are many and never simple. As such, 
there seem to be two significant changes affecting this 
category of political communication. Broadcast communication 
does not seem to have experienced a transformation in the 
same sense or to the extent of conversational communication. 
However, it seems to have broadened and expanded rather than 
transformed. 
The first expansion seems to be the dramatic cost 
reduction for individuals entering broadcast communications. 
Prior to the internet production of mass communication media 
tended to be rather expensive for individuals. Newspaper, 
radio, and television campaigns were generally reserved for 
organizations or the wealthy. The advent of the internet and 
the World Wide Web dramatically reduced broadcast entry 
costs for individuals and therefore expanded or allowed 
entry by virtually anyone with an internet connection. One 
example of cost savings has been MAPI’s move in 2001-2002 
away from printed material. Costs that were $400,000 per 
year are down to $15,000 per year.124 Additionally, as the 
internet has become more affordable and accessible by most 
U.S. individuals classic mass media organizations have 
expanded their focus to include the internet. All of the 
major news firms have concurrent news web pages.125 Today, 
through the internet, many individuals can afford to stand 
                     
124 Mackey. 
125 See http://www.cnn.com. http://www.cbsnews.com. 
http://abcnews.go.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed November 1, 2007). 
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on a soapbox and be heard by the world, limited only by the 
receiver’s internet access and the sender’s message. In a 
sense the playing field has been leveled126 and the relative 
power advantage between large organizations and individuals 
to access large bodies of people has shrunken. Therefore, 
individuals may be more empowered as Thomas Friedman 
claims,127 at least in some aspects. 
The next change or closest conception of transformation 
seems to be the merging or pairing of mass media with 
information aggregation. Figure 4 explains information 
aggregation in terms of the communication sender being many 
people or the mass sending messages to one or several 
people, bottom up communication. For example, in the United 
States one form of information aggregation takes place every 
election when votes are cast, counted, and the results are 
announced. “The many” are communicating to “the few” or one. 
Weare explains information aggregation as the collection, 
analysis, summarization, and transmission of information 
from groups to individuals of agencies.”128 Classic mass 
media has only been unidirectional. Or in other words, the 
newspaper, television, and radio are efficient at getting 
messages to the masses; however, they do not get information 
back from the masses. 
With the advent of the internet information aggregation 
has become much more simplistic and less expensive. The 
                     
126 Michael Gurstein, ed., Community Informatics: Enabling 
Communities with Information and Communications Technologies (Hershey, 
PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2000), 74. 
127 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 
Twenty-First Century (United States of America: Farrar, Staus and 
Giroux, 2006), 593, 11. 
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internet can allow for a quick response collection to 
broadcast communication. The analysis and summarization may 
take a bit longer. However, if websites are set up with a 
pre-intent to collect, analyze, and summarize data 
information aggregation can be almost instantaneous. Another 
unique advantage websites garner over traditional television 
and radio is the ability to know exactly how many people 
have accessed the information. This is done through web 
counters. Additionally, if a website has a downloadable 
file, a Word document for example, then the number of times 
that information is downloaded is measurable. For example, 
NAM provides approximately 7000 Podcasts of its weekly radio 
show to its membership. One other example of combined mass 
communication and information aggregation are e-mail list 
servers. These are lists of e-mail addresses grouped under a 
single interest. For example, a person might send an e-mail 
to a membership list of his Corvette club to determine if 
the group wants to participate in a rally on a specific 
date. The list server is a list of these e-mail addresses in 
which the sender clicks the group name and the receivers e-
mail addresses are placed in the “to” box of the e-mail 
program (mass communication). Information aggregation occurs 
when the receivers open, read, and reply to the e-mail and 
they pass back information such as availability or make 
suggestions. Not only can the receiver respond directly to 
the sender, he may respond to the entire group by hitting 
the “reply all” button. Oliver Froehling identified these 
practices in the uprising in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994. He 
writes that academics were initially utilizing the internet 
                     
128 Weare, 659-691, 665. 
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to provide background and conflict information on the 
rebels, the Zapatistas. As the revolt continued and appeared 
to be heading towards a blood bath, list servers and 
bulletin boards began to appear.129  In the end the internet 
helped to prevent the revolting citizens from being 
militarily annihilated.130 It allowed information to be 
simultaneously everywhere131 rallying support from inside 
and outside of the Mexican border.132 Without the internet, 
the massiveness of the international and national response 
may have never arrived in such force and in such a timely 
manner. 
By examining Figure 8,133 it would appear that e-mail 
is strictly one-way communications. However, by choosing to 
reply to an e-mail a person enters into dialogue therefore 
becoming two-way. Additionally, many web sites provide an 
opportunity to respond to the one-way broadcast nature of 
the World Wide Web media and therefore become two-way 
communications, dialogue, in the form of e-mail. Granted, 
the chances of a dialogue between the web site and sender 
stand some chance of failure dependant upon the nature, 
attitudes, and demeanor of the sender and receiver. 
Additionally, the volume of responses to the web site can 
                     
129 Oliver Froehling, "The Cyberspace "War of Ink and Internet" in 
Chiapas, Mexico," Geographical Review 87, no. 2, Cyberspace and 
Geographical Space (April 1997), 291-307, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0016-
7428%28199704%2987%3A2%3C291%3ATC%22OIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O, 296 (accessed 
August 17, 2007). 
130 Ibid., 296. 
131 Ibid., 297. 
132 Ibid., 298. 
133 Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps, Virtual Teams: People Working 
Across Boundaries with Technology, Second ed., (Wiley, 2000), 199. 
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limit dialogue. However, information aggregation can take 
place. Of special note on the top of Figure 8 are the 
Communication Speed and Variety lines. These lines suggest 
that as technology progressed and progresses that speed and 
variety will continue to increase. If hypermodernity and 
technology is facilitating social pressure then the speed at 
which social pressure rises or the speed to mobilize might 
follow this line as well. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Communication Media Palette 
Putnam suggests that the internet acts predominately as 
an information supplement for the news media.134 However, in 
the case of MAPI and NAM the internet has become the 
significant disseminator of information. Many aspects of 
technology and categories of communications are readily 
identifiable within the structures of NAM and MAPI. The 
                     
134 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 
2000), 221. 
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NAM’s mass communication is sent via web pages, internet 
newsletters, Podcasts, press releases, press briefings, 
television, and radio shows.135 On the other hand, MAPI 
moved away from hard copy mail in 2001 and predominantly 
depends on electronic media, e-mail and web content to 
disseminate information.136 According to Cam Mackey of MAPI, 
they send out over 95% of their mass content to members via 
email, including all of their work on the Chinese Yuan in 
2003.137 Although NAM continues to utilize the one-way mass 
media of television, radio, and newsprint it has expanded to 
include the use of the internet.138 According to Hank Cox of 
NAM, leading up to the USCC hearings in 2003 dissemination 
and aggregation of information and communications with 
membership was dominated by internet communications.139 
3.  Conclusion  
Technology and hyper-modernity seem to work together 
decreasing the communication barriers of time, space, costs, 
and SPST. They have done so by increasing the speed and 
variety of communications and decreasing costs of 
communication. The increased speed has allowed the rate or 
exchange of communication to increase which allows more 
                     
135 Hank Cox, National Association of Manufactures, Vice President, 
Communications & Media Relations, e-mail correspondence, July 26, 2007. 
136 Cam Mackey, Manufacturers Alliance, Director, Marketing & GM 
Councils, e-mail correspondence, July 20, 2007, (MAPI). 
137 Cam Mackey, Manufacturers Alliance, Director, Marketing & GM 
Councils, e-mail correspondence, September 4, 2007, (MAPI). 
138 Hank Cox, National Association of Manufactures, Vice President, 




collaboration on projects encapsulated by fixed time frames 
or fixed dates. Or in other words, this added speed shrinks 
space and effectively speeds the communication process as 
well as multiplies the amount of collaboration processes 
relative to pre-information age technology. Within the NAM 
and MAPI leadership circles, the space shrinkage may have 
allowed for more intra-organizational communications and 
more collaboration before deadlines and may have allowed a 
more effective, more focused campaign than could have been 
possible before the information age. 
Broadcast media such as newspapers, radio, and 
television still remain significant sources of information 
in today’s society. However, in the case of MAPI and NAM 
these organizations are depending on the internet more to 
disseminate their message and to motivate and be motivated 
by their members at a much faster and focused pace. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Michael Goodhart provides a roadmap of key dynamics in 
his definition of globalization and those dynamics seem to 
be identifiable within the context of the 2003 USCC 
hearings, 2003-04 congressional bills, and administrative 
practices. These dynamics seem to have reacted within the 
domestic, liberalism, and state centric levels. Market 
integration, internationalization of regulatory capacity, 
and declining policy can be seen in Figures 1 and 9 in 
orange with directional arrows acting on society and 
congress. However, these two dynamics seem to be interlinked 
through the administration and its neo-liberal ethos. Hyper-
modernity and technology seem to be somewhat neutral in 
motivation, although, act to speed up, facilitate, or focus 
social pressure from the bottom to the top of society. The 
green areas and text in Figures 1 and 9 seem to capture the 
methods of societal defense suggested by Polanyi. 
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Figure 9.   Globalization, Polanyi and the Yuan 
Market integration and the resulting U.S. dislocations, 
job loss, unemployment, manufacturing migration, and trade 
deficit seemed to have generated perceptions of pressure or 
movements within the manufacturing and labor sector for 
action or sector defense much in the same manner that 
Polanyi described in the Tudor and Industrial Revolutionary 
periods. 
Additionally, perceptions of administrative inaction or 
actual administrative reluctance to enforce policy seem to 
suggest the administration’s desire for the wheels of 
international organizations to unfurl a solution. As 
suggested here, internationalization of regulatory capacity 
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may increase as state policy decreases or as state policy is 
retracted depending on the administration’s political 
agenda. The reverse may take place with a change of 
administration. Internationalization of regulatory capacity 
my decrease as policy options are reclaimed by the state or 
in other words, state reinforcement. 
The second movement or defense of the manufacturing and 
labor sector seems to be entwined within Goodhart’s 
declining policy and regulatory role of the state, 
internationalization of regulatory capacity, 2003 USCC 
recommendations to Congress, and signals sent to China and 
the administration through introduced bills. The apparent 
give and take between declining policy and the 
administration’s reliance on international regulatory 
capacity has garnered several attacks, specifically aimed at 
each of these dynamics. Reluctance of the President to 
interject under Section 421 landed a retaliatory lawsuit and 
a direct attack, threat, or signal on or to presidential 
power. As well, perceived administrative inaction may have 
added to the dynamics of the second movement as seen in 
congressional bills attempting to enforce or signal the need 
to enforce policy already written. 
Finally, 2003 USCC recommendations were dominated by 
Chinese Yuan revaluation sway and seemed to suggest 
political bandwagoning. However, the job loss, manufacturing 
migration, unemployment, and large trade deficit statistical 
data seem to suggest true perceptions of social movements 
seen within special interest groups and numerous 
congressional bills. 
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Hyper-modernity and technology seem to be working to 
increase the speed and effectiveness of communication. Both 
can be seen in Figure 1 and 9 acting to focus and facilitate 
pressure. Additionally, this seems to be where this argument 
diverges from Polanyi’s. The speed at which this pressure 
was facilitated or felt within the legislative arena serves 
to highlight two points. First, the rapid rise of pressure 
may serve to offset the long term or overall rate of 
dislocations by focusing attention sooner. Or in other 
words, the rapid rise of pressure may serve to alert leaders 
sooner rather than later of a problem or issue therefore 
allowing the opportunity to react and slow processes before 
excessive damage is done. However this also poses problems 
in light of the second point. The rapid rise of pressure may 
exceed the capabilities of the system to respond in a timely 
manner. 
Finally, that brings back the original question, why 
was perceived pressure to revalue the Chinese Yuan so 
vigorously generated? Dislocations generated by the 
integration of Chinese and U.S. markets seemed to generate 
perceptions in SIGs and select congressmen instilling a 
somewhat sense of urgency for action. This argument is along 
the same lines as Polanyi’s argument. However, the speed of 
the perception of pressure and the resulting reaction to 
that perception is the main point. 
Why does speed matter? It matters in that the rise of 
political pressure and the time needed to adequately deal 
with particular situations may exceed the time available 
therefore leading to possible rash or reactionary policies. 
Longer term policies aimed at the manufacturing and labor 
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sector may aid in offsetting the pressures felt by SIGs and 
congressmen rather than short term policies that seem to 
attack globalization or attempt slow the rate of market 
integration. 
If globalization continues to increase and 
manufacturing migration continues to follow suit, then it 
would be expected for U.S. manufacturing unemployment to 
rise even further paralleling the transformation of the 
Tudor, Industrial Revolution, and even the U.S. 
transformation away from an agrarian society. Therefore, it 
may be necessary to enact long term policies now in order to 
offset or ease future problems to help mitigate knee jerk 
reactive policy. 
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